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Holding the Antitrust Line: Laker Airways v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines
Conflicts among nations increase as international economic ac-
tivity expands. Domestic courts become the arena for international
disputes when two nations concurrently assert jurisdiction over a sin-
gle series of transactions, but seek to apply differing and mutually
inconsistent regulatory policies. In Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian
World AirlinesI the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit refused to let proceedings in Great Britain prevent
United States courts from hearing the antitrust claims of Laker Air-
ways Ltd., 2 a British corporation. The court found that the conspira-
torial acts alleged by Laker caused sufficient harmful effects within
United States territory to justify applying United States antitrust law.
To protect this jurisdiction from interdictory foreign proceedings,
the court approved the issuance of an injunction preventing certain
defendants from participating in the foreign proceedings.
Laker Airways arose out of the collapse and liquidation of Laker
Airways Ltd. (Laker), which brought suit under the Sherman and
Clayton Antitrust Acts3 in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. 4 Laker alleged that Pan American Airlines,
Trans World Airlines, McDonnell Douglas Corp., McDonnell Doug-
las Finance Corp., British Airways, British Caledonian Airways, Luf-
thansa, and Swissair 5 had conspired to fix air fares at predatory levels
and had interfered with Laker's financing to eliminate Laker as a
I Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
2 Laker Airways Ltd. (Laker) burst into prominence in 1977 by offering "no frills"
transatlantic passage at approximately one-third the prevailing rates. By 1980 one in
seven transatlantic passengers travelled Laker Airways. Laker managed to operate at a
profit until mid-1981. The Times (London), Feb. 7, 1982, at 17, col. 1.
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 12-27 (1982).
4 The action was brought by its liquidator, Touche Ross, on November 24, 1982.
The allegations led to a United States Department of Justice criminal investigation into
alleged price-fixing on North Atlantic routes by European and United States airlines. The
investigation's requirements for the production of sensitive information on price motives
provoked a strong response on jurisdictional grounds by the British Government. British
Department of Transportation officials met with United States Deparment of Justice offi-
cials several times to head off this investigation. The Times (London),June 25, 1983, at 1,
col. 2.
5 KLM and Sabena were added on February 15, 1983. SAS, a Scandinavian airline,
and UTA, a French airline, were made parties on October 4, 1983. The Times (London),
Oct. 4, 1983, at 15, col. 1.
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competitive force. 6 Laker estimated its damages in excess of $350
million, to be trebled pursuant to sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.
British Airways and British Caledonian applied to British courts
for an injunction restraining Laker from prosecuting its American
antitrust claim against them, and for a declaration that they were not
liable to Laker. 7 Almost immediately, Swissair and Lufthansa applied
for similar injunctions and, pending a hearing, were granted interim
injunctions. Next, Laker made KLM and Sabena defendants in its
American antitrust action. To avoid the "potentialfail accompli" of all
defendants obtaining preemptive interim injunctions from the High
Court, the United States district court enjoined KLM and Sabena
from participating in the British proceedings.8
The Queen's Bench refused the airlines' application, 9 and Brit-
ish Airways and British Caledonian appealed. Before the appeals
were heard, the British Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
promulgated the Protection of Trading Interests (U.S. Anti-Trust
Measures) Order 1983, prohibiting United Kingdom airlines from
complying with all orders and prohibitions resulting from the pend-
ing American antitrust action, including production of documents. ' 0
6 Laker alleged that members of the International Air Transport Association (IATA)
resisted and for several years delayed British and United States government authorization
of Laker's transatlantic service. For the reasons for the delay see Laker Airways v. Dept. of
Trade, [1977] Q.B. 643. When Laker eventually inaugurated service in 1977, the IATA
airlines perceived a threat to their markets and pricing system, and agreed to set rates at a
predatory level. By the beginning of 1982 Laker's finances were overstretched, and it
sought refinancing. Laker's financing was complicated by a decline in the value of the
pound, because its revenues were largely in pounds, but its debts were in dollars. Laker's
competitors further conspired to interfere with attempts to reschedule financing by pres-
suring its lenders to withdraw from a loan deal without notice. The airlines allegedly
forced Laker's leading creditors, General Electric and McDonnell Douglas, to cut off funds
to the company by threatening to buy their aircraft elsewhere. Luthansa and Swissair
eventually admitted making these threats. The Times (London),July 20, 1983, at 4, col. 3.
Pan American, Trans World Airlines, and British Airways reduced rates on their full ser-
vice flights even further to match Laker's rates and allegedly secretly paid travel agents
high commissions to divert passengers from Laker.
7 Without such orders the American assets of the airlines would be subject to execu-
tion. Treble damages against the British airlines would not be enforceable in Britain be-
cause of the British Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 (BPTIA), 50(1) Halsbury's
Statutes Edited (3d Ed.) 259-264. This act encapsulates the British view that extraterrito-
rial law may not be applied to govern legitimate British trading interests. "Clawback"
provisions appearing in this and other foreign statutes provide that if a court of another
state gives a judgment against a protected person, the amount paid in judgment in excess
of actual compensation may be recovered in an action.
8 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C.
1983).
9 British Airways Board v. Laker Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. 375. Parker, J. for the
Queen's Bench rejected the airlines' arguments that the American action would be unjust
to them and contrary to the policy of the BPTIA, holding instead that the Act was directed
toward invasions of British sovereignty and did not warrant action in this case.
10 Stat. Instr. 1983, no. 900. This is the second application of' this provision of the
Act in less than a year, the British government barring a British company from complying
with United States demands involving the Soviet gas pipeline. The Protection of Trading
LAKER AIRWAYS
The British Court of Appeal found the Secretary's order and direc-
tions so disabling to the British parties in the American action as to
make it unjust to allow Laker to proceed against them. t '
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, in reviewing the propriety of the district court's injunctions, ex-
amined the grounds that supported United States and Great Britain
jurisdiction. The court found authority to apply United States anti-
trust law "whenever conduct is intended to, and results in, substan-
tial effects within the United States," reasoning that this authority
derives from the universally recognized sovereign right of all nations
to control and regulate activity within their own boundaries.' 2 Ap-
plying antitrust legislation to foreign acts is a legitimate exercise of
jurisdiction when the territorial effects are significant and not so in-
consequential as to be unreasonable.' 3 The involvement of the in-
terests of American consumers, creditors, and the judiciary are
sufficient territorial contacts to justify asserting jurisdiction.
The court rejected the argument that British jurisdiction based
on nationality overrides territorial-based jurisdiction.' 4 Acknowl-
edging that the United States and Britain held jurisdiction concur-
rently, the court next considered whether the district court's
injunction' 5 was consistent with concurrent jurisdiction 16 and com-
ity.' 7 The court found that such injunctions are warranted,only
when necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the enjoining court or
to prevent the litigant's evasion of important public policies of the
forum. The court determined that the sole purpose of the British
proceedings was to terminate the American action. Thus, the court
concluded that the district court's injunction was a proper measure
to protect legitimately conferred jurisdiction, and to prevent KLM
Interests (U.S. Re-export Controls) Order 1982, Stat. Instr. 1982, no. 885, p. 2465 (ob-
jecting to provisions in 15 C.F.R. §§ 374, 376, 379, 385, 389 (1984) as applying outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States pursuant to the Export Administration Act
of 1979, Pub. L. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503).
11 British Airways Board v. Laker Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. 395.
12 731 F.2d at 925. See M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CON-
TEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 1295 (1981).
13 The court stressed that the territorial effects doctine is not an extraterritorial asser-
tion ofjurisdiction. 731 F.2d at 923.
14 The court rejected an argument of "paramount nationality" which appellants of-
fered as a rule to prioritize the authority of courts to proceed in cases of concurrent juris-
diction. Nationality of the parties, held the court, is but one of the factors to consider in
avoiding conflicts stemming from concurrent jurisdiction. Id. at 934.
15 Ordinarily, antisuit injunctions are limited to restrain only residents of the forum
state absent treaty provisions to the contrary. In Laker Airways the Dutch and Belgian air
service treaties made it justifiable to restrain KLM and Sabena, foreign parties, in foreign
proceedings. Id. at 932.
16 Concurrent jurisdiction arises when two or more states have legitimate interests in
prescribing governing law over a particular controversy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 37, § 30 comment c (1965).
17 Comity is the deference a domestic forum must pay whenever possible to the act of
a foreign government not otherwise binding on the forum. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113
(1895).
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and Sabena' 8 from escaping the application of statutes of economic
importance to the United States.
Furthermore, the court found that the injunctions of the United
Kingdom were not entitled to comity. 19 The court reasoned that,
because the goal of comity is to increase the international legal ties
that advance the rule of law within and among nations, foreign acts
inherently inconsistent with this purpose circumscribe the limits of
the principle's application. The district court's injunction, con-
trasted with the British injunction, was merely a defensive measure
intended to preserve jurisdiction, not to quash the power of another
court to adjudicate a claim.
The court in Laker Airways attempted to reconcile these conflict-
ing assertions of jurisdiction by defining the conflict as one gener-
ated by political branches of government.20 The court rejected a
process ofjudicial interest balancing, 2 1 finding that a court could not
refuse to enforce a law its political branches determined to be neces-
sary and desirable. Political compromise is not the role for the judi-
ciary, but rather is more appropriate to the executive and legislative
branches.
Enjoining a citizen from suing in the courts of another nation is
an extraordinary remedy.2 2 Though it is well settled that courts are
empowereed to restrain foreign proceedings where jurisdiction is
properly before the court, 23 such power to enjoin is rarely exercised
18 KLM and Sabena do not have antitrust immunity under their respective air service
treaties. To the contrary, those treaties contain express language subjecting them to the
jurisdiction of the United States over predatory pricing and abuse of monopoly power.
731 F.2d at 932.
19 The court delineated the considerations important in applying United States anti-
trust laws consistently with the principles of comity: the intent of Congress, the apprecia-
ble anticompetitive aspect of the injury, attenuated contacts with the United States, and
the existance of strong foreign interests. The court refused to allow this determination to
be made in a foreign court. Id. at 938. The dissent would narrow the scope of the injunc-
tion on grounds of comity, finding no clear United States intent to enforce the claims,
contrasted with emphatic British intent. Id. at 956.
20 There was no suggestion that comity should be exercised to avoid hardship to a
party who might otherwise be caught between the inconsistent imperatives of two fora.
Nor did the government ownership of KLM and Sabena implicate significant interests of
Britain as a state. Id. at 933. See generally Baker, Antitrust Conflicts Between Friends, 11 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 165 (1978).
21 A judicial interest balancing test would have the court weigh the competing na-
tional interests and resolve the conflicts of law according to its determination. See
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), on remand to,
547 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983),judgment afd by, No. 83-2008 (9th Cir., Dec. 27, 1984).
22 See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES (1973). Cases conflict
as to whether the policy of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982), applies when
a foreign action is sought to be enjoined in a district court. Compare Canadian Filters
(Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577 (1st Cir. 1969), with Harvey Aluminum,
Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1953), and Galco Food Products v.
Goldberg, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 379 (N.D.IlI. 1971).
23 Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890); Velsicol Chemical Co. v. Hooker
Chemical Co., 230 F. Supp. 998 (N.D.Ill. 1964); Western Elec. Co. v. Milgo Elec. Corp.,
450 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.Fla. 1978).
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because delicate issues of jurisdiction and comity are involved. 24
Concurrent jurisdiction requires that parallel proceedings be al-
lowed to continue until a judgment is reached in one court that is res
judicata in the other.25 Because there is no difference between ad-
dressing an injunction to the parties and addressing it to the foreign
court itself,26 antisuit injunctions effectively restrict the foreign
court's ability to exercise jurisdiction. Comity compels courts to act
with the object of increasing the legal ties among nations.
Courts have countervailing obligations that sometimes justify
subordinating the foregoing considerations. Courts have a duty to
protect the jurisdiction conferred to them to ensure litigants full jus-
tice. 27 Moreover, courts are charged with enforcing the significant
policies of the forum. Injunctions have been found proper when nec-
essary to thwart attempts to assert exclusive jurisdiction in an area of
concurrent jurisdiction, 28 to enforce an existing judgment, 29 to pre-
vent vexatious litigation,30 or to prevent circumvention of the laws of
the forum. 31 The authority for defensive measures against interdic-
tory proceedings has long been approved by the Supreme Court:
"where the jurisdiction of a court, and the right of a plaintiff to pros-
ecute his suit in it, have once attached, that right cannot be arrested
or taken away by proceedings in another court." 32 The equitable
circumstances surrounding each antisuit injunction are considered in
determining the propriety of issuance.
Underlying the injunction in Laker is the controversy regarding
the reach of American antitrust jurisdiction. The principle that a
country is authorized to prescribe laws within its own territory is a
fundamental and internationally recognized basis of jurisdiction. 33
American courts have recognized this principle since Chief Justice
Marshall stated in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon34 that "[t]heju-
risdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclu-
sive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by
24 Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of North America, 651 F.2d
877 (3d Cir. 1981) (duplication of issues and delay in filing foreign actions do not justify
breach of comity); Chase Manhattan Bank v. State of Iran, 484 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (foreign action not vexatious or choice of forum unreasonable); Velsicol, 230 F. Supp.
at 998 (foreign proceedings involving foreign rights not vexatious); Sperry Rand Corp. v.
Sunbeam Corp., 285 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1960) (no evidence of vexatious litigation).
25 E.g., Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939).
26 Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612 (1849). See also Compagnie des Bauxites, 651
F.2d at 877.
27 Peck, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 625.
28 James v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co., 14 Ill. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858 (1958).
29 Velsicol, 230 F. Supp. at 998; Bethell v. Peace, 441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971).
30 Harvey Aluminum, 203 F.2d at 105.
31 Cole, 133 U.S. at 116; Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964); Compagnie des
Bauxites, 651 F.2d at 877.
32 Peck, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 625.
33 See, e.g., Island of Palmas Case, 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 289 (1928).34 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
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itself." In its first foreign commerce antitrust case, American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co.,35 the Supreme Court narrowly construed the
reach of American jurisdiction, dismissing a complaint by one United
States corporation that another United States corporation had re-
strained Panamanian and Costa Rican banana trade with the United
States. Justice Holmes said "the character of an act as lawful or un-
lawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act was done." 36
United States v. American Tobacco Co. 3 7 brought the issue of territo-
rial based jurisdiction before the Court again in a case involving
American Tobacco's monopolization of the tobacco trade and agree-
ments to divide world markets with Imperial, a British firm. The
court's silence on a lower court ruling that a conspiracy having ef-
fects within the United States justifies applying United States law im-
plied a reluctance to extend American Banana's immunity to such an
arrangement. Courts in early cases were cautious about departing
from American Banana in prescribing liability to acts consummated
outside the United States, but nevertheless expanded American ju-
risdiction, usually finding an act or agent within the United States
that justified asserting jurisdiction. 38
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)3 9 extended the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction principle to include effects within the United
States, regardless of origin. 40 Alcoa involved agreements entered
into in Switzerland by several foreign companies to limit the amount
of aluminum to be sold in the United States. Judge Learned Hand
decided that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to reach con-
duct by foreign nationals outside the United States that did not have
an effect on United States imports or exports. Hand noted the limita-
tions observed by nations in the exercise of jurisdiction and ex-
pressed concern about the complications likely to arise if the United
States were to treat as unlawful every agreement among foreigners
that had some repercusssion in the United States. Thus, Hand de-
veloped a standard for the extraterritorial application of American
antitrust laws: conduct must be intended to restrain and must have
35 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
36 Id. at 356. This no longer reflects the current law of the United States. Though
never explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court, lower courts readily disregard it. E.g.,
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1184-87 (E.D.Pa.
1980).
37 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packet-Fahrt-Actien Gesell-
schaft, 200 F. 806 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911); United States v. Pacific and Arctic Railway and
Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913); Thompsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917); United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
39 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (on certification from the Supreme Court, sitting as a
court of last resort).
40 Alcoa apparently found no need to apply the restrictive American Banana territorial
limitations, expanding jurisdiction to encompass the locus of the effect, as well as the con-
duct. Id. at 443.
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an effect on American trade.4 ' Subsequent pronouncements by the
Supreme Court and the American Law Institute firmly entrench the
legitimacy of Alcoa. 42
The effects doctrine's presumption of territoriality has been a
major source of international controversy. 43 Shortly after Alcoa was
decided, Canada passed the Business Records Protection Act 44 to
thwart discovery in United States extraterritorial regulatory actions.
In 1964 Britain enacted the Shipping Contracts and Commercial
Documents Act4 5 designed to thwart Federal Maritime Commission
investigations .46
In 1980 that Act was expanded in response to the controversy of
In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation4 7 into the British Protection of Trad-
ing Interests Act (BPTIA). 4 8 The Act allows the Secretary of State to
prohibit compliance with discovery orders from foreign courts, ren-
ders certain foreign judgments unenforceable in the United King-
dom, and provides a right of action to recover the penal portion of
multiple damages awarded by foreign courts. 4 9 The purpose of these
measures is to curb the extraterritorial exercise of United States ju-
risdiction, which is perceived to infringe British sovereignty in viola-
41 Alcoa's requirement of intent to affect United States commerce has never been re-
fined, judicial formulations often altogether omitting discussion of intent. E.g., Sabre
Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, 285 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). But cf.
Zenith Radio, 494 F. Supp. at 1189 n. 65 (requiring only general intent); Antitrust Division,
United States Dept. ofJustice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations 6 (1977) (ef-
fects within the United States must be "foreseeable"). Nor has the substantiality of the
effect been clarified beyond requiring "substantial," "material," or "direct" effects. E.g.,
United States v. R. P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 822 (N.D.Cal. 1957). See RESTATE-
MENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED), § 402, (Tentative
Draft No. 2) (1981).
To provide a clearer standard for determining when United States antitrust jurisdic-
tion attaches to international business transactions, President Reagan signed into law the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246 codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982). Under the Act, the Sherman Act applies only when conduct has a
"direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on United States domestic, import,
or export commerce. The Act was first applied and interpreted by a United States federal
court in Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
42 See American Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946); Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (unlawful effects are often decisive); Continental Ore Co.
v. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (finding irrelevant that the for-
eign conduct was lawful in the country where it occurred); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965); Antitrust Division, United States
Dept. ofJustice, Antitrust Guide for International Operations 6 (1977).
43 See Debates in the British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 404 Parl. Deb.
H.C. (5th Ser.) 586 (1980). See also PicciottoJurisdicitonal Conflicts, International Law and the
International State System, II INT'L J. Soc. L. I l (1983). Baker, Antitrust Conflicts Between
Friends, II CORNELL INT'L L. J. 165 (1978).
44 [1947] Ont. Stat. c. 10 codifiedat Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 54 (1970).
45 1964, ch. 87, § i. See Parl. Deb. H. C. (5th Ser.) 1215-84 (1964).
46 See In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C.
1960).
47 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). See Sabalot, Shortening the Long Arm of American Anti-
trust Jurisdiction, 28 LOYOLA L. REv. 213, 238 (1982).
48 50(l) Halsbury's Statutes Edited (3d Ed.) 259-264.
49 Id.
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tion of international law and comity, and to dampen exorbitant
damage awards.50
Many courts have responded to the conflict by taking the "judi-
cial interest balancing" approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.5 1 Timberlane involved a
United States company that was prevented from establishing an op-
eration in Honduras to export lumber to the United States by the
concerted efforts of firms already established in Honduras. The
Timberlane test consists of three elements: whether there is some ef-
fect on American commerce; whether the type and magnitude of the
restraint makes it cognizable as an antitrust violation; and whether
American interests are sufficiently strong to justify an assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 52 The requirement that there be some
effect on American commerce is less demanding than the Alcoa ap-
proach, but the Timberlane test treats comity as an essential and limit-
ing consideration in the extraterritorial application of United States
law. 53
Whether Timberlane's standards operate in practice was tested in
Uranium.54 Like Laker Airways, the prospects for orderly litigation
were limited from the outset. Nine of the twelve foreign uranium
producers named in Westinghouse's complaint failed to respond to
judicial summons, and default judgments were entered against
50 See Sabalot, supra note 47, at p. 234.
51 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
52 Id. at 613. This approach was followed with some modification in Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). The court suggested the
following as relevant to the balancing process:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that
abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeablility;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants
relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to
perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both coun-
tries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the
foreign nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue. Id. at 1297.
53 This process of balancing the competing judicial interests has been endosed by the
Justice Department and the State Department. Antitrust Guide, supra note 42; Letter ofJ.
Brian Atwood, Assistant Sec. of State, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 27, 1979), reprinted in S. REP. No. 444, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 118 (1979).
54 617 F.2d 1248. Cf. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. [1978] 1 All
E.R. 434 (criminal aspects of United States antitrust laws on grounds of territorial effects
held an invasion of sovereignty); Re Westinghouse Elec. and Duquesne Power Co., 16
Ont.2d 273 (High Ct. Jus. 1977). This litigation was largely settled during 1981.
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them.55 Three of the foreign governments involved had enacted leg-
islation specifically aimed at nullifying the impact of American anti-
trust legislation. The district court found it impossible to balance
judicially the competing interests of the United States and foreign
countries. The court of appeals in Uranium upheld the lower court's
refusal to apply notions of international comity and rejected the
United Kingdom's amicus argument that Alcoa no longer retained vi-
tality after the Timberlane line of cases.56
Laker Airways follows in this vein. The opinion is significant in
that it empowers courts to employ defensive antisuit injunctions
against interdictory proceedings where there is a legitimate basis of
jurisdiction. 57 The opinion reasserts that the right of the United
States to regulate conduct that produces effects within United States
territorial boundaries is legitimate, self-determined, and cannot be
superseded by blocking statutes or vexatious proceedings in foreign
tribunals. 58 Comity will not be granted to conduct that frustrates the
significant policies of the domestic forum. 59
Equally significant, Laker Airways redefines the judiciary's role in
accommodating, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the conflicting
prescriptive laws of nations. The court finds itself bound to imple-
ment the legislated national policies60 and ill suited to adjust these to
contradictory foreign policies.6' By this formulation, the court must
single-mindedly enforce domestic laws, and the responsibility for
reconciling these laws with foreign policy shifts to the legislative and
executive branches. 62
The effect of these pronouncements is limited by the fact that
they are issued by a federal court of appeals, and the Supreme Court
has not recently considered the problems. The unusual facts may
further limit the application of Laker Airways as a statement of the
significance of comity to resolve disputes under concurrent jurisdic-
tion.63 Nevertheless, the reasoning of Laker Airways is sound, and the
55 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
56 Uranium, 617 F.2d at 1254. The touchstone continues to be "intended effects,"
and considerations of comity and fairness apply only in the determination as to whether
American authority should be asserted. Id. at 1255.
57 Interdictory proceedings would seek to prohibit another court's assertion ofjuris-
diciton. 731 F.2d at 915. By implication, parallel proceedings will rarely be made subject
to such injunctions.
58 Id. at 935.
59 Id. at 937.
60 Id. at 949.
(i Id. at 948.
62 Recognizing the application of antitrust jurisdiction to the establishment of inter-
national airline rates, Congress authorized the Civil Aeronautics Board to immunize
agreements from antitrust laws. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973. Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)).
(3 Laker Airways, like Uranium, can be read consistently with the emerging Timberlane
line of cases. Thus, the conclusion that Laker Airways advocates the demise of comity is
erroneous. See Uranuim, 617 F.2d at 1255.
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hard facts of this case, as those in Uranuim, suggest that balancing
judicial interests is impracticable. 64 Antitrust counselors asked to
determine the legality of business arrangements that have an effect
on United States interests would do well to apply and strictly inter-
pret United States laws, as any controversy might be resolved in a
forum adopting the views of Laker Airways. 65
Laker Airways' formulation does little to defuse the current con-
troversy over what is viewed as the exorbitant assertion of United
States antitrust laws abroad. 66 The court's position has important
international ramifications .67 Authorizing United States courts to
defend United States jurisdiction both thwarts and challenges efforts
to nullify United States antitrust legislation. Judicial conciliation be-
tween forums becomes restricted to areas where the policies of na-
tion are in agreement or where the conflicts are not significant.
Significant conflicts are left to the legislative and executive branches
to resolve.
The decision is noteworthy for the legitimacy of the exercise of
judicial authority and for the propriety of result. Two principles
emerge as fundamental: a sovereign may regulate conduct occurring
outside its territory that causes harmful results within its territory;
and United States courts are bound to uphold the acts of Congress.
The former derives legitimacy from the congressional intent to reach
anticompetitive conduct affecting the United States regardless of the
conduct's locus, 6 8 coupled with a conception of territoriality recog-
nized in both United States and international law. 69 The latter prin-
ciple derives legitimacy from the recognition that comity in an
international context necessarily involves political questions, 70 and
64 See J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, 1 ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD,
§ 6.16 (1981).
65 See Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is Covered?, 8 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 1 (1974).
66 The British, Swiss, and West German governments have launched strong protests
to the Justice Department's investigation and grand jury indictments. The British govern-
ment fears that an assessment of $ 1.05 billion could bankrupt both British Caledonian
and British Airways. Invoking the BPTIA was in part due to the British Government's
financial stake in British Airways, a government owned corporation. Other reasons were
to prevent the scope of the Justice Department's investigation from expanding, and to
make clear the British government's determination to resist the extraterritorial application
of American antitrust laws. The Times (London), Mar. 18, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
67 The court has assumed a role whereby voluntary and discretionary surrender of
jurisdiction by the judiciary is restricted. When the United States Government seeks to
enforce the law, some discretion will be used in prosecuting the claim if foreign policy
interests are involved. Diplomatic pressure similar to that brought to bear on the Justice
Department's criminal antitrust investigation relating to Laker Airways resulted in abating
the criminal investigation connected with Uranium. No such buffer exists in civil suits.
Such rigid application endangers parties of being trapped by the inconsistent imperatives
of the United States and the United Kingdom in these matters.
68 See Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 312 (1978).
69 See The Schooner Exchange, I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116; Case of the S.S. "Lotus", [1927]
P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10.
70 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
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from the idea of separation of power, which is fundamental to the
United States Constitution. 7 1
Jefferson feared that the judiciary, "like gravity, ever acting, with
noiseless foot, and alarming advance . . . is engulfing insidiously the
special governments into the jaws of that which feeds them." 72 In
foreign affairs, the United States Government must speak with one
voice; the court in Laker Airways is properly restrained, giving unified
voice to the political branches. Expanded conceptions of territorial-
ity necessarily accompany the progress of international economic ac-
tivity. A strong statement of national interest, accompanied by
consistent action, clearly defines the parameters of American con-
duct and inevitably improves international relations. Firm adher-
ence to the principles espoused in Laker Airways will foster the growth
of international mechanisms to resolve the problems created when
conflicting policies of nations intersect in an area of concurrent
jurisdiction.7 3
-CHARLES THELEN PLAMBECK
71 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
72 T-OMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY 152 (S. Papover ed. 1949).
73 In the absence of such international mechanisms, the Laker Airways case continues
to develop. Soon after this opinion was handed down the district court judge with whom
the case remained considered three options should Laker be permanently enjoined: ap-
pointment of an American guardian ad litem to proceed for Laker; issuance of a court
petition asking the Department of State to handle the case; or issuance of a counterinjunc-
tion ordering Laker to proceed with its case. The inquiry was rendered moot by a decision
rendered on July 19, 1984, by the House of Lords allowing Laker to proceed. British Air-
ways Board v. Laker Airways [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413. The Law Lords found that the Civil
Aeronautics Board could have exempted the alleged predatory fares from U.S. antitrust
laws but did not. Had the fares been approved, it would have contravened the Bermuda II
treaty, which governs air service between the United States and Great Britain. Moreover,
the court chose to recognize American jurisdiction on the ground that the carriers had
consented to such jurisdiction. By obtaining licenses to operate under this treaty, the air-
lines had subjected themselves to a regime under which U.S. law would apply to their
operations within their territory. The Law Lords rescinded the injunction, as there was no
alternative forum where Laker could seek relief. They did not find, however, that the Sec-
retary of State for Trade and Industry had acted ultra vires by invoking tile BP-IA. Id.
Judge Harold Greene signed an order dated Oct. 11, 1984, to protect the jurisdiction
of the court and the rights of the plaintiff under U.S. law enjoining British Airways and
British Caledonian from taking further steps in foreign courts.
The Justice Department's investigation has cleared British Caledonian of thwarting
Laker's financing attempt, and President Reagan has called off the investigation. The New
York Times, May It, 1984, at D14, col. 1.
In March 1984 the Philadelphia law firm of Levin and Fishbein initiated a class action
suit on behalf of persons who bought tickets on several airlines named as defendants in
Laker .4invays. No. 84-1013 (D.D.C. 1984). The theories are: conspiracy to remove Laker
as a competitive force resulting in higher prices, and negotiatations outside the IATA
framework, unsanctioned by the Civil Aeronautics Board. The defendants have responded
with a motion to dismiss, arguing that any award of treble damages is repugnant to Ber-
muda II. The British Government's desire to privatize British Airways may improve pros-
pects for a settlement in order that they may sell an unencumbered entity. Conversation
with Howard Sedran, attorney at Levin and Fishbein (12-31-84).

